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The devious maze 
of the international order:
the importation of reforms
David Ibarra
This paper seeks to make a historical review of the models
which have guided the international economic order since the last
century: how and why they evolved until bipolarism spilled over into
international relations and the neoliberal ideology took root. It also
examines the adjustments that the countries on the periphery have
made in order to adapt to these models. In Latin America, the abrupt
opening of frontiers and the abolition of protectionism, but without
an appropriate institutional framework, have given rise to lower eco-
nomic development, deterioration in the social field, and the 
discrediting of democracy. This analysis, when applied to specific
changes which have taken place in the models adopted and the way
they have been implemented in the region, reveals their relative
degrees of validity and the existence of considerable areas of leeway
which have so far been insufficiently exploited.
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For over two decades, the basic neoliberal economic
policy package has remained unaltered in spite of the
succession of governments of different political incli-
nations which have taken office all over Latin
America. At best, proposals have been put forward for
second- or third-generation reforms designed to make
up a posteriori —a decade later— for the shortcom-
ings or imperfections of the original measures.1
The initial proposals were successful in correct-
ing the imbalances in prices, the fiscal accounts and
external indebtedness which plagues the Latin
American economies in the 1980s, but in most cases
they were a resounding failure in terms of satisfying
the basic popular demands: promoting growth,
employment and distributional equity; strengthening
social rather than merely political democracy, or tak-
ing full advantage of the removal of frontiers all over
the world.
Furthermore, in a number of cases the presiden-
tial candidates, such as Fujimori and Menem, won
their election on the basis of anti-neoliberal policy
platforms, only to turn later into singularly enthusias-
tic implementers of the reforms contained in the
Washington Consensus. Even social democratic gov-
ernments have had to curb initiatives seeking to depart
from the prevailing orthodox approach, because of the
risk of losing the support of foreign interests or pow-
erful domestic groups. Thus, the policies and objec-
tives of governments, whatever their political leaning,
have never been independent of the unitary concept
which has determined the common denominators of
the continent or, hence, of the approaches taken by
preceding governments, even when there has been a
transfer of power from one political party to another. It
is hardly surprising, then, that the strategies applied
have proved to be almost identical even when there
has been a change of the political groups in power,
thus failing to reflect the people’s will. It is therefore
important to explain how the roads to be followed are
defined, how national priorities and objectives are
chosen, and how the national social and political bal-
ances are reconciled with those of the external eco-
nomic environment.
A decisive influence has undoubtedly been exert-
ed in this by the new configuration and rules of the
world order, which have found the Latin American
countries not only ill-prepared but also weakened by
the effects of the 1980s debt crisis. When countries are
struggling to cope with the imbalances of that decade,
the international financial agencies make their support
subject to compliance with certain conditions. These
criteria have sometimes caused national policies to
follow directions other than those that the govern-
ments would have chosen of their own free will. It
should be noted that these rules have been multiplied
in recent times and have been aimed at promoting the
adoption of neoliberal-type structural reforms rather
than favouring development.2 Under the pressure of
these circumstances, governments have adopted com-
promises which have caused them to open up their
markets and dismantle protectionist measures, those
reflecting authoritarian and populist approaches, and
many of the measures for the protection of workers
and businessmen.
Free trade, deregulation and the withdrawal of the
State from productive activities run counter to criteria,
values and policies for which the free play of the mar-
ket is only an imperfect substitute, especially when the
systems of institutions of the countries concerned are
incipient or suffer from serious gaps. Let us take two
simple examples. Financial liberalization, in the
absence of mechanisms to regulate the market, has
given rise to a wave of banking crises in much of Latin
America. Likewise, the abrupt elimination of frontiers
has created a system in which competition is not
between equals but often between advanced foreign
producers and backward domestic producers, with
1 See Williamson (1990) and Kuczynski and Williamson (2003).
2 The programmes of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have
been criticized as being over-restrictive, as being designed to com-
press demand, and as neglecting the development of the countries
concerned. In the opinion of Feldstein, the IMF should resist the
temptation to force reforms on the countries. The criticisms of the
World Bank have accused it of giving up the financing of invest-
ment projects and concentrating instead on the promotion of glob-
alizing reforms, while paying little attention to protection of the
environment and increasing the supply of public goods. See
Feldstein (1998), Rodrik (2000), Kapur and Webb (2000), Kahn and
Sharma (2001) and Buira (2003).
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effects which have been destructive but rarely in the
Schumpeterian sense.
At all events, by being forced to enter more or
less abruptly into a globalized world, the countries of
the region are being forced to absorb enormous histor-
ical imbalances, since their institutional structure is
incompatible with the demands of markets that know
no frontiers, and the mix of winners and losers in the
political and economic game has been radically
altered. While the countries of the periphery naturally
do not have much influence on the direction of the
changes in the international order, they have to cope
with the problems of the speed and manner in which
their economies have to absorb the resulting changes.
In effect, the one-sided impact of the reforms gives
rise to a disorderly and divided transition within the
countries which impedes the formation of flexible
national consensuses that can facilitate economic and
political change.
It is important to limit the division of common
interests that were previously united by nationalism.
Today, the Latin American societies are deeply divid-
ed internally: the interests of labour groups are divid-
ed between skilled and unskilled workers, between
those working in the modern sector of the economy
and those in the informal sector, and between those
employed in big firms and those working in small and
medium-sized enterprises. The same sort of thing
occurs in the business sector: there is a division of
interests between foreign and domestic investors,
between importers and those producing for the domes-
tic market, between large firms and smaller ones, and
between the real and financial sectors of the economy.
Similar divisions exist among the different social
groups, political parties and between the provinces
and metropolitan areas of the countries. 
All this has led to internal divisions: while the
alliances which have been formed between the nation-
al and foreign elites ensure the punctual fulfillment of
international demands, national arrangements to light-
en the enormous social costs of the relevant changes
are constantly put off. For this reason, people have
begun to be disappointed with democracy, to feel that
elections do not serve to change anything, and that one
government is much the same as another.
In the following pages, we will try to put the
models of the world economic order in their proper
dimension: to strip them of their sacred aura. Thus,
section II makes a historical review of the forces
which originally led to the disappearance of the colo-
nial world and subsequently to the end of the bipolar-
ity of international relations, giving way eventually to
the predominance of the neoliberal ideology which has
resulted in tensions between the world order and
national democracies and between free trade and the
domestic development of the Latin American coun-
tries. In section III, the level of abstraction of the
analysis is lowered in order to make a critical analysis
of specific changes over the last half-century in the
models advocated by the central countries for the
development of the periphery. These changes have
modified the validity of these rules and reveal that
there are substantial areas of leeway which have so far
been only poorly exploited by the Latin American
countries.
In the first half of the past century, colonialism final-
ly disappeared and a number of totalitarian regimes
collapsed. Between 1945 and the present day, the
number of sovereign nations increased from 45 to
almost 200.3 The prevailing ideas led to the creation
of a large number of States which, in order to be
members of the international community, had to
make themselves responsible for their internal order
and development, thus representing a further step in
the process of Westernization of the nations.
Looking back, the breakdown of the colonial
pact involved deep changes in the international order
and the way societies on the periphery link up with it.
Many of the forms of support previously given by the
metropolitan countries and the linkages with the lat-
ter in terms of trade, production specialization and
finance were cancelled or reduced. There were, how-
ever, new opportunities for the establishment of links
with a broader range of developed countries, and
above all there was more room for the economic and
political independence of the newly independent
nations. Libertarian ideas and struggles between the
dominant countries softened the demands made on
subordinate countries, facilitating the reorientation of
their internal forces towards the interests of the Third
World.4
At this time, modernization of the State was
considered to be essential in order to achieve an
effective development strategy. Nationalism and
social engineering were therefore put forward as
ways to liberalize the development of the former
colonies and the countries of the periphery in gener-
al. This, together with the changes in economic and
social structures brought about by the changes in the
international order, made it necessary to abandon
rigidly economistic approaches and embrace instead
the broader concepts of political economy and inte-
grated social development.5 The world order of the
time needed legitimate States able to keep order and
seek the well-being of their countries.
Likewise, the end of the Second World War and
the desire to avoid possible conflicts between nations
(especially the superpowers) led to the creation of the
Security Council as the supreme political organ of the
United Nations and guarantor of international collec-
tive security. Within this Council, the power of veto
possessed by its five permanent members served as a
means of impeding the dominance of one or the other
of the great blocs into which the world was divided. At
the same time, the extension of the competitive strug-
gle of the Cold War to the Third World increased the
opportunities both for development support and for the
freedom of governments to run the economic and
social affairs of their countries within a range of pre-
dominantly Keynesian styles.
This situation favoured more intensive develop-
ment on the periphery, especially in Latin America.
Since economic and political models are ideological
constructs which inevitably reflect the rationalization
of interests, as well as the consensual views of First
World academics, however, they are not and cannot be
unchangeable. Through them, the central countries
seek to regulate the behaviour of the countries on the
periphery and lay down the conditions for their incor-
poration into the international community. There are
incentives and punishments which range from access
to the markets of the industrialized countries to politi-
cal alliances or ostracism.
In a dependent relationship it is not necessary for
a country to be a colony in order to suffer limitations
on its sovereignty, nor does full sovereignty depend on
being a member of the United Nations (Badie, 1992).
As long as the First World holds the economic, politi-
cal and military power and its institutions generate the
ideas that guide the world, develop the most advanced
technologies and products and fix the rules of the
international order, the countries of the periphery will
continue to be subordinates even though they may
have some leeway for action. In any case, the emanci-
pation histories of those countries usually involve the
idea of integration, not separation: they are the stories
of peoples excluded from the main community of
nations who strive to gain entry to it and follow its
rules. This explains the enormous integrating power of
universal models which also usually bring with them
the formation of alliances of interests between the
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3 See Croeker, 2003, pp. 32-45.
4 See Cardoso and Faletto (1970), Furtado (1965), Migdal (1988)
and Dos Santos (2003).
5 See Cardoso and Faletto (1970).
elites of the dominant and dominated countries, lead-
ing to a symbiotic relationship from which it is hard to
escape.6
In the second half of the twentieth century, the
changes in the economies of the industrial societies
speeded up. The forces of production and cross-border
trade created situations of mutual dependence between
countries which came up against the safeguards charac-
teristic of national sovereignty. At the same time, pri-
vate or semi-public actors emerged who weakened the
power of national governments. More recently, the col-
lapse of the socialist countries became another central
element in the changing realities and models, by doing
away with the division of ideological approaches that
marked the early post-war years.
The disappearance of bipolarity from the world
and the new world economic conditions clamour for
far-reaching reformulations of the models governing
the international order. The transnationalization of pro-
duction and trade demands the abolition of frontiers and
the international convergence of national economic and
social policies – and even cultures – in order to ensure
the security of trade, production and capital flows from
the world centres.
This accounts for the emphasis on deregulation,
the opening up of frontiers, the elimination of State par-
ticipation in production, and the elevation of price sta-
bility to the level of a central objective of governments.
The former concern for the domestic well-being of
countries and for growth has given way to the require-
ments of globalization as such. In exchange for the
renunciation of economic sovereignty, a boost has been
given to the formal modernization of democracy and
the international convergence of political systems to
correspond with the Anglo-Saxon model.
There has been undeniable progress in this latter
respect, as reflected in the decline in authoritarian
regimes on the periphery, but this progress has
remained incomplete because in many cases it has not
been possible to ensure sustained development or to
meet the needs of the population in terms of employ-
ment, income, security or access to social services. To a
certain extent, the progress in terms of the formaliza-
tion of the political order has been cancelled out by the
disturbing effects of economic change. This is where
the tensions caused by the unrealistic assumption that
economic and socio-political phenomena are independ-
ent of each other becomes apparent: an assumed inde-
pendence which is necessary if one wishes to maintain
the illusion of national sovereignties untouched by the
new international order.
Changes in the universal rules of conduct of States
have caused breaks with the past, especially in the case
of nations on the periphery. Thus, the war in Iraq led to
the abandonment of the political multilateralism of the
Security Council; in Africa the new nation-States have
not yet been consolidated, but must already be disman-
tled for the benefit of globalization; and the civilizing
promises of the dominant discourse about free trade
and formal democracy are already crumbling: first,
because of the growing inequalities within and between
countries, and second, because there are States which
are formally democratic and sovereign but have their
hands tied when it comes to meeting reasonable
demands by their citizens.
The abandonment of the goals for Third World
growth is in stark contrast with the emphasis and efforts
placed on reducing inflationary pressures and creating
a favourable climate for transnationalized trade or
investment flows. The concentration of efforts on the
stabilization of prices all over the world has been
tremendously persistent and successful. Thus, after
standing at almost 16% in 1985-1989 and over 30%
between 1990 and 1994, world inflation sank to 4% in
2000-2003. Between the first and last periods, the aver-
age rise in prices went down from 4% to 2% in the
advanced countries, from 48% to less than 6% in the
developing economies as a whole, and from 186% to
8% in Latin America. This was achieved at the cost of
innumerable institutional reforms, policy changes and
social sacrifices: suffice it to mention the abolition of
national frontiers, deregulation and the decline of
national monopolies, the independence of central
banks, or extreme fiscal discipline, carried to the point
of ruling out any type of anti-cyclical action.7
Much less effort has been made to raise and equal-
ize world growth, however. The world economy is in a
phase of unsteady development: it grew at the rate of
3.6% per year between 1985 and 1989, 1.4% between
1990 and 1994, and 3% between 2000 and 2003, while
Latin America reached only 1.5% in these last four
years. On average, the rise in per capita income
between 1975 and 2000 shows that the gap between
rich and poor is widening still further: the countries
with high levels of human development registered an
increase of 2.1% per year, those with intermediate
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6 See Said (1993). 7 See Rogoff (2003).
levels 1.6%, and the poorest nations, only 0.5%. Latin
America also lost ground, since its per capita GDP grew
by only 0.7% per year over this quarter-century period.8
The post-modern tension between world-level
demands and those of the national democracies is
eroding the foundations of nationalism as the primary
source of identity and of unity of the citizens around
collective goals such as development or the defence of
their own interests. Over the last two decades, at least
in Latin America, the first-named demands have been
punctually met, but the satisfaction of the second ones
has been systematically postponed. It is paradoxical to
see how the efforts to democratize the peripheral
States have taken place side by side with a relentless
assault on nationalism, which, like it or not, captures
the imagination and aspirations of the people and,
above all, seeks self-government for society. For two
decades now, in Latin America vital State functions
have been turned over to the hidden hand of globalized
markets and governments have renounced the use of
the main instruments of social engineering and the
underlying development and employment policies.9
As a result, countries have been put in a position
where foreign investment and the sale of the best
national enterprises to foreign owners are used to pro-
vide – but only temporarily – the resources to shore up
the economic apparatus of the first-, second- and third-
generation neoliberal reform process, while the social
structures and ultimately the prestige of democracy
itself continue to crumble. The ideologized view that
the State commits all kinds of errors, while the hidden
hand of the market possesses all kinds of virtues, is
still alive, although the market has shown itself to be
deaf to almost all the legitimate demands of the citi-
zens of developing countries.
As a result, the social tensions associated with the
dominant model have grown so strong that they can no
longer be concealed. This is shown by facts ranging
from the social decay and symptoms of ungovernabili-
ty that affect the underdeveloped areas, and the failure
of the members of the European Union to comply with
their budget ceilings, to the failures of the Seattle
(1999) and Cancún (2003) ministerial meetings of the
World Trade Organization. It is also shown by the per-
sistence of hunger, poverty and disease in vast areas of
the world,10 even including some segments of the
industrialized nations.
Like it or not, globalization and its demands have
closed off the ways towards incorporation into the
industrialized world that were followed by the nation-
alist societies of Germany, Japan or the United States
itself. The leeway in this respect has narrowed and
changed, since the international rules now in vogue do
not permit industrial protectionism and subsidies, pub-
lic enterprises, or the fixing of national economic prior-
ities or maintenance of deficits by governments. These
privileges are now confined to the advanced countries,
as shown by their anti-cyclical policies or the protection
given to their agriculture and industry: for these and
other reasons they have budget deficits much higher
than those considered acceptable for peripheral coun-
tries11 and they permit the absorption by the public
authorities of the losses of their big enterprises.12
Likewise, the governments of the First World maintain
or adopt protectionist measures in response to domes-
tic political or electoral pressures, in violation of the
spirit or letter of international laws and agreements.
The refusal to do away with agricultural subsidies, the
agonizingly slow opening up of their markets for tex-
tile products, or the recent protectionist actions of the
United States government (in the case of steel, among
others) are typical examples of flagrant imbalances in
the international trade regime which prejudice above
all the countries of the periphery.
At the present time, one way of incorporating
countries into development with a view to future
access to the First World is that followed by India,
China or the south-east Asian countries. These coun-
tries have been orthodox in the defence of their inter-
ests and heterodox in their observance of the univer-
sal models. Their elites and governments have united
to establish development strategies, create economic
power centres, apply industrial policies, subsidies and
tax reductions and attract investments, while at the
same time mixing improvements in the well-being of
the population with sometimes repressive social poli-
cies. In this way, they have weakened their economic
and technological dependence relationships, obtained
greater leeway for action, and at the same time taken
advantage of the worldwide opening up of markets.13
Another way, albeit slower and more uncertain,
12
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11 The budget deficit of the United States is 5%-6% of GDP, that of
Germany 3-4%, that of France 3-4%, and that of Japan 7%. See IMF
(2003) and OECD (2003).
12 Such as Chrysler, Air France, savings and loan associations, the
Capital Risk Management Fund and Japanese banks, to name only
a few. See Ho and Lin (1991).
13 See Amsden (2001).
8 See UNDP (2002).
9 See Ibarra (2003).
10 According to the United Nations, over 1,150 million people had
to survive on less than a dollar a day in 1999. See UNDP (2002).
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would be to redouble the efforts made in internation-
al forums to secure a change in the universal models
so as to make them more equitable and favourable for
the development of the periphery. In this field, as the
Fifth Ministerial Conference of the WTO (Cancún,
2003) showed, real progress still seems to be far off in
view of the vested interests and reluctance of the
advanced countries. Nevertheless, some progress is
being made. The First World’s concern to channel aid
preferentially to the poorest areas of the globe, as
manifested at the International Conference on
Financing for Development (Monterrey, 2002), seems
to be a step in the right direction, although halting and
incomplete, provided such aid is not linked to a
demand that the beneficiary countries must first carry
out the first-, second- and third-generation reforms.
The innovative proposals made in the developing
world present a wide range of variants. Because of
their enormous population and internal diversity,
China and India are areas of multinational integration
which even represent or could represent serious polit-
ical and economic challenges to the leading world
centres. This enables them to enjoy greater freedom to
remodel the rules governing the world order. The
south-east Asian countries, under the protective
umbrella of Japan and the other giants of the region,
have benefited  and continue to benefit from degrees
of political and economic heterodoxy not enjoyed by
other areas of the periphery.
In Latin America, the possibilities seem smaller,
but by no means non-existent. Central America has not
yet succeeded in reaching the stage of political inte-
gration or even of the convergence of national eco-
nomic policies. Paradoxically, the experiment of the
Central American Common Market and the possible
political union which was to follow it (there is already
a Central American Parliament) has been held up by
the abolition of trade frontiers worldwide and the mul-
tiplicity of rules for the new world order which were
designed for nation-States. The Mercosur countries
have better prospects because of the joint size of
Brazil and Argentina, but in addition to the sequels of
the various crises they are faced with political and eco-
nomic strategy disparities which do not appear to be
easy to reconcile, especially against the background of
the existing international tensions and the continental
free trade project sponsored by the United States. In
the case of Mexico, there are opportunities which have
not yet been exploited because of its proximity to the
United States and its integration with that country’s
vast markets. In short, the possibility of freely shaping
the future of Latin America seems to be running up
against hegemonic influences which hinder the forma-
tion of innovative systems of its own. Even greater
obstacles stand in the way of the evolution of Africa
and the Moslem Arab world, but even there initiatives
are being put forward.
All in all, however, the available options for inde-
pendent development are shrinking (Chang, 2002),
and against all the ideas of nationalism this is leading
almost inexorably to the political incorporation of the
Third World countries into the multinational integra-
tion blocs into which the world of the future will prob-
ably be divided and which will be on a more even foot-
ing for competing with each other. Naturally, the
advance of the globalizing post-modern model will
lead to a significant loss of cultural, social and eco-
nomic diversity in the world, as well as keeping citi-
zens far removed from participation in the decisions
which most affect their social life, especially in the
case of the groups which will be absorbed by the dom-
inant power centres. The process of the merging or
integration of countries is already well advanced in
Europe, although less so in North America, and it
could still run into obstacles, resistance and even eth-
nic prejudice in various parts of the world.
Looking into the future, this process –together
with the gradual abandonment of multilateralism by
the great economic and political centres of the world–
hints at a return to a multipolar world in the not so dis-
tant future, with all the advantages and disadvantages
that that entails.14 At the same time, the shortcomings
and failures of economic neoliberalism and the war
against terrorism suggest the possible return –howev-
er remote it may be– of political economy, in the sense
of creating a more balanced relationship between the
economy and society, between the State and the mar-
ket, and between the rights of the individual and col-
lective or basic human rights.
14 See Kennedy (1993), Connelly and Kennedy (1994) and
Kupchan (2003).
The economic models and paradigms we import are
not immutable: they change with circumstances and
with the inevitable confrontations between forecasts
and actual results. We may refer, for example, to the
evolution of the conceptions of the industrialized
countries – which we accept for ourselves – about the
development of the periphery. These conceptions fre-
quently place emphasis, in a general and simplified
manner, on some fundamental obstacle to progress,
leaving aside any other order of priorities.
History permits us to clarify these questions.
Between 1940 and 1950 underdevelopment was
explained by the insufficiency of investment and sav-
ing, which should be made good through the entry of
international funds. It was believed that by increasing
capital formation it would be feasible to move the fac-
tors of production from low- to high-productivity sec-
tors. International trade was considered to be good, but
not sufficient to open the doors of development: con-
sequently, some protectionism and moderate external
account deficits, to be covered by injections of capital
from abroad, were considered to be acceptable, as was
the transfer of resources from traditional to modern
activities with support from active industrial policies,
even if this was reflected in fiscal deficits, provided
these were only small.
Some progress was made in these ideas during
the following years (the 1960s and the first half of the
1970s), when it was discovered that the insufficient
supply of entrepreneurial cadres was limiting the
absorption of resources from the First World and
reducing the effectiveness of the promotional meas-
ures of governments and international agencies.
Following this logic, the deliberate promotion of busi-
ness training and measures to make up for shortcom-
ings in this respect were incorporated into government
programmes. The peripheral countries were persuaded
to set up development banks, to encourage joint
investments in strategic areas of the economy, and to
strengthen national capacity for training and project
evaluation. Contrary to what it is doing now, the World
Bank promoted the establishment of development
banks all over Latin America, set up the International
Finance Corporation –hich provides backing for pri-
vate enterprises and projects– and the Economic
Development Institute for the training of business
cadres. Up to this point, the changes made in the mod-
els may be described as fine-tuning which does not
depart from the basic tenets of the international order
of the early postwar years and of Keynesianism.
From then on, however, the recommendations by
the First World to the peripheral countries changed
rapidly until they penetrated to the core of the coun-
tries’ economic policies. Now, the central objective
ceased to be the lack of saving, investment or business
capacity: these were only petty sins. The new diagno-
sis held that the problem lay in a distorted price struc-
ture which limited the absorption of labour and led to
sub-optimal rates of GDP growth. The main blame of
this phenomenon was laid at the door of State inter-
ventionism which aggravated faulty resource alloca-
tion, promoted the use of capital-intensive techniques,
and gave rise to unproductive rents protected by offi-
cial policies. The remedy therefore lay in competitive
exports with a high labour content. To this end, it was
recommended to open up markets and do away with
subsidies and all protectionist measures, including
State participation in production. The technological
backwardness or deficient trade networks of the
peripheral countries did not matter, as the market
would soon reveal the real competitive advantages of
each country.
This was how the neoliberal explanation of
development began. Countries must abandon State
Keynesianism at the economic level and nationalism
in the political field. On the one hand, governmental
failures and the inability of the State to take the place
of the wisdom of the market were highlighted as the
reason for the main structural imbalances in the econ-
omy, while on the other hand it was held that renewed
access to development could be achieved through an
increase in exports, which depended on the liberaliza-
tion of product and capital markets.
In practice, however, an increase in export trade
is not something that can be achieved immediately, nor
is it easy to make exports the driving force of devel-
oping economies. In contrast, the abolition of frontiers
is usually accompanied by an avalanche of imports
which destroys domestic enterprises and favours the
formation of privileged export enclaves, while foreign
14
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investment, rather than giving rise to new products
and jobs, often serves only to finance the transfer of
the best domestic resources and enterprises into for-
eign hands. Furthermore, such investment can hardly
take the place of public investment in infrastructure or
human capital or the supply of many non-tradeable
goods and services (energy, transport or essential pro-
duction services), and much less can it define a coun-
try’s long-term strategy for its insertion in world 
markets.
Nevertheless, the views of the centres prevailed.
The Latin American countries liberalized their markets
and deregulated their economies, in the belief that this
would open the door to rapid development or win the
First World’s acquiescence. What actually happened
was at variance with these hopes, however: over more
than two decades (1980-2000) the pace of Latin
American development fell to half of that reached in
the previous thirty years, with high levels of unem-
ployment, marginalization and enormous maladjust-
ments in the labour market. Reformulation of the mod-
els was therefore called for.
The abundance of skilled human resources was
rapidly identified as the reason for the success of some
nations (Southeast Asia), while a shortage of such
resources was an obstacle to development. The World
Bank’s 1991 annual report repeats the neoliberal dis-
course of previous years, but it adds a new ingredient:
investment in human capital as a precondition for
development (World Bank, 1991). This represented
some progress in the model, but it does not solve all
the problems, for the training and optimal use of
human capital requires growth and complementary
facilities which are not created spontaneously by the
market.
A revisionist approach to the First World’s rec-
ommendations gained greater strength in the second
half of the 1990s. Once again, the contrast between the
meagre results and the enormous social costs of the
Latin American reforms based on greater openness, as
compared with the success of the activist governments
of the Asian countries, led to an exercise of reformula-
tion and the rediscovery of the State as the appropriate
agent for leading the transition to globalization.
Without good governance, it was said, the reforms
would not give the expected results or secure the
development of the peripheral countries. This asser-
tion was correct, but insufficient, as the proper play of
democracy cannot be reduced merely to questions of
administrative efficiency, as suggested. Reluctantly, it
began to be accepted that the State and the political
sphere have an essential part to play in the handling of
domestic political reforms and external relations.15
Good governance, or at least better governance,
is undoubtedly essential for achieving sustained devel-
opment. There is a risk, however, that excellence in
this respect may be made a prior requisite for gaining
access to the solidarity and aid of the First World, as
was made clear at the International Conference on
Financing for Development (Monterrey, 2002).
Adapting to a world without frontiers, completing
institutional reform, applying healthy macroeconomic
and microeconomic policies, deregulating markets,
guaranteeing the rule of law, eliminating corruption,
lessening the complaints of those who have lost as a
result of the changes made, and achieving so many of
the other requirements implicit in the term “good gov-
ernance” is practically equivalent to having already
solved the basic obstacles not only to development but
also to the transition to a world without frontiers. Like
it or not, sustained development, democratic modern-
ization and adaptation to the new international order
are slow and painful processes of adjustment which
can hardly be imposed as entry conditions that could
only be satisfied by the most advanced nations of the
world, not the poorest ones.
The last migration of the paradigm advocated by
the international financial organizations – which is not
shared by the whole of the First World – seems to raise
the concerted fight against poverty to the level of an
international priority. In view of the fact that social
decay is getting worse rather than better, poverty is no
longer seen as being exclusively the result of govern-
ment errors and over-regulation of markets, but is also
attributed to systemic effects of the new international
order.
This fundamental qualitative leap forward is
expressed in the World Development Report 2000-
2001 (World Bank, 2001a), which proposes a three-
pronged strategy that goes beyond the economic level
to address political issues. First, it recommends multi-
plying the economic opportunities of the poor by
measures to strengthen their income from scarce assets
(land and education) through both market-based and
non-market-based policies. Second, it supports the
strengthening of social safety nets in order to reduce
the extreme vulnerability of the excluded segment of
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15 See World Bank (1993 and 1997), Stiglitz (1998), McGuire
(1997), Ibarra (2001), Abramovitz (1989) and Rodrik (1995).
the population. Third, it suggests reforms designed to
transfer greater political power to the poor so that pub-
lic institutions will be more ready to attend to their
demands. Finally, it admits that there are multiple
ways to development and to the eradication of pover-
ty, and the specific ways adopted must depend on
national priorities. Thus, it is beginning to be accepted
that it is wrong to recommend standardized policies, in
view of the diversity of the historical and institutional
situations of each country, and to put economic, social
and political reforms in watertight compartments
where they have no mutual influence.
This represents an enormous leap forward,
because it is now admitted that the importance of
relations based on the market, as an area of competi-
tion among individual private actors acting strategi-
cally to gain profits, must be viewed in more relative
terms and must be complemented by political rela-
tions based on a very different logic: the sovereignty
of the people, the State of law, and other practices for
democratic participation and consensus-building.16
This clearly brings out the underlying unresolved ten-
sion between the values of the market and those of
democracy.
Much has been said on what the peripheral
nations should do to achieve success in their access to
the globalized world. Little has been done, however,
to make the conditions of competition more equitable
and to create institutions to limit the polarizing
effects of the free play of the market, that is to say, to
create an institutional architecture which is suffi-
ciently transnational to humanize development and
make it sustainable. Over twenty years ago, the
Brandt Report put forward some indispensable polit-
ical actions for this purpose, when it asserted the need
to give the countries of the South a more equitable
share of international power and decision-making, to
allow their production centres to grow, to regulate the
practices of transnational enterprises, to ease the debt
burden, and to promote development  (Brandt, 1980).
As we have seen, the First World development
model has been constantly evolving, and the institu-
tions and policies of the peripheral countries have
also changed at its behest, at the cost of enormous
disparities with their actual situations. The great leap
forward of the twentieth century took place when
national economic sovereignty was sacrificed for the
benefit of greater openness and the return of its pow-
ers to the market, with the objectives of each country
being made subordinate to the goals of a globalized
world. Development aid thus gave up the financing of
investment projects and openly embarked instead on
the task of promoting the neoliberal reform process.
Now, while continuing to insist on the maintenance of
the parameters of that process, the fight against
poverty has been added to the model, as though there
were no contradictions between the two goals.17
The changes in international conceptions on
development are due to some extent to a better under-
standing of the problems, but they primarily reflect
the changing interests of the powers which formulate
and reformulate those paradigms. The proposals have
been completed and fine-tuned, as shown by the iden-
tification of the so-called second- and third-genera-
tion reforms (which strictly speaking should have
accompanied or preceded the reforms initially pro-
moted), but they are still far from addressing the com-
plex dilemmas of the neoliberal transition of the var-
ious peripheral countries,18 especially the establish-
ment of a new stable balance between the functions
of the market and those of the State.
Let us look at a typical case. The financial open-
ness process, or global financial integration, as it is
now called, was carried out in most of the Latin
American countries on the unproven assumption that
it would have positive effects on economic growth
and the deepening of financial flows. Subsequently,
empirical studies made by the IMF19 concluded that
no robust and significant relation could be found
between financial integration and development.
Furthermore, in the case of the peripheral countries a
frequent association was found between financial 
16
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16 See McCarthy (1995).
17 As already noted, the distribution of the international funds to
combat poverty depends on countries being granted a seal of “good
governance” for satisfying the main requirements of the neoliberal
reform process. According to the World Bank, “Although some
empirical controversies persist, government performance is increas-
ingly accepted by researchers and especially by policymakers as a
guide to aid allocation. Government performance is generally
agreed to include economic policy, other anti-poverty programs,
and the quality of governance and institutional capacity” (World
Bank, 2001b, p. 93). The new ingredients added to the model do not
eliminate the linking of aid with the application of the reforms
advocated by Washington but are additional to this requirement.
18 The paradigmatic components of the Washington Consensus are
now accompanied with a host of new reforms designed to promote
profound institutional changes (good governance, reform of the
legal system, reform of property rights, labour reforms, eradication
of corruption, reform of the regulatory system) which, if imple-
mented, would supposedly make good shortcomings in the initial
measures of the Consensus. See Williamson (1990).
19 See Rogoff and others (2003) and Agosin and Ffrench-Davis
(1996).
liberalization and increased volatility of consumption
(the latter variable was considered to be a better than
GDP as a measure of the well-being of the popula-
tion) or proclivity to crises and contagion. By impos-
ing small controls on capital, Chile was able to avoid
the serious pro-cyclical problems due to oscillations
in short-term foreign capital flows.
On the other hand, the IMF’s studies seem to
show that there is a certain minimum organizational
and institutional threshold below which financial inte-
gration does not help countries much and may even
cause them damage. This happens in the absence of a
solid legal and supervisory infrastructure, codes of
conduct for transnational corporations, and low levels
of corruption, among other factors. It would be hard
for most of the countries of the periphery to meet these
requirements, because of their backwardness and the
fact that their institutions corresponded to the previous
system of financial protectionism and not to full inter-
nal and external financial freedom. Consequently, the
institutional framework which was essential for the
transition was absent, incomplete or only incipient, as
well as often corresponding to a level of development
not yet reached by the those countries. The Mexican
banking crisis is a clear example of long-standing dis-
parity between reforms and an outdated institutional
framework.20
By way of conclusion, we cannot but note the
inconstant nature of the models proposed by the First
World and the imperfections of the transnational insti-
tutions and their conceptions on how to harmonize the
economic and social development of the peripheral
countries with the place they are forced to occupy in
the new world order. Economies are integrated and
become interdependent, but the transnational institu-
tions needed to lessen the polarizing excesses of the
market are yet to be created or else are at an extreme-
ly incipient stage. This is why it is necessary to pro-
ceed cautiously rather than unquestioningly adopt the
model rules which the central countries want to
impose. The imported models are usually over-sim-
plistic in failing to take account of the mutual influ-
ences between the economic, political and social
spheres, and they are also at fault in seeking to stan-
dardize policies and reforms without bearing in mind
the special historical and institutional features or
degree of development of each individual country.
Consequently, these models should not be viewed as
immovable dogmas but rather as flexible guidelines
for international coexistence, within which to incorpo-
rate and safeguard each country’s own goals and inter-
ests. Ultimately, the success of modernization and
development programmes depends on them springing
from proposals which are broadly shared within each
country, not on copying outside ideas supposed to be
applicable to all nations.21 This, and no other, was the
road which the United States, Germany and Japan fol-
lowed in their entry into the industrialized world and
which is being followed by South Korea, Taiwan,
China and India today.22
(Original: Spanish)
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21 These criteria are already beginning to be taken into account in
the new rules on conditionality adopted by the Executive Board of
the IMF late in 2002 (IMF, 2002).
22 See Bourgin (1989), List (1885), World Bank (1993), Amsden
(2001), Skocpol and others (1985), Komiya and others (1988), and
Stiglitz and Yusuf (2003).20 See Ibarra (1998).
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